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court, so that they may exercise their rights and powers as voters in
electing a governor who will act conscientiously in the exercise of his
powers.
The result in the case is desirable since it places responsibility for
the failure to enact a law on the person who causes that failure. Such
placing of responsibility for failure of an act gives the people an oppor-
tunity to take corrective steps.6 Further, this requirement of reasons
serves to inform the public as to why a particular bill was vetoed by
their governor. In cases where non-legislative bodies have opportunity
to exercise vital powers, the public should be allowed, in all fairness,
to hear the reasons why this vital power was so exercised.
Of course, after the governor has once given his reasons for a
veto the court should not attempt to pass upon the validity of such
objections but should leave the merits to be considered by the legis-
lature.' For a court to pass upon the substance of objections accom-
panying a veto would be an example of encroachment by the judiciary
upon the functions of the executive. JoHN L. YOUNG
EQUITABLE SERVITUDES-TERMINATION-CHANGE IN
NEIGHBORHOOD
Deeds to lots in a certain subdivision contained restrictive
covenants as to character and minimum cost of residences which might
be erected thereon. Since the establishment of the subdivision, a num-
ber of business houses had been erected there, and the city zoning
commission had declared the subdivision to be a business district. The
plaintiff lumber company acquired a lot adjoining defendant's garage
and asserted its right to erect thereon a business house. Defendant
denied that right because of the restrictive conditions mentioned.
r In the principal case the attempt to exercise the veto power was
made after the adjournment of the legislature. Conceding that the
statement by the court in the Arnett case, that the reasons must be
given in case of a veto while the legislature is in session, is mere
dictum (Arnett v. Meredith, 275 Ky. 223, at p. 231), yet there would
seem to be no ground upon which a rational distinction could be made
in cases where the legislature is in session. The same reasons for
requiring an accompanying message exist, without regard to whether
the legislature is in session or adjourned.
"Whether the exercise of the "power to disapprove any part or
parts of appropriation bills embracing distinct items" (Ky. Const.,
Sec. 88) will require an accompanying message containing reasons
therefor will depend upon the court's construction of See. 88 in its
entirety. One case intimates that a part or parts of an appropriation
bill embracing distinct items could be vetoed by a mere notation of the
fact of veto without any reasons. (Dickinson v. Page, 120 Ark. 377,
179 S. W. 1004 (1915). However, if the reason for the rule is sound,
then there is no valid ground for relaxing the rule when applying it
to parts of an appropriation bill as contrasted with the veto of a bill
in toto. (See the dissenting opinion in the Dickinson case, 179 S. W.
1004, at p. 1007.)
7 Birdsall v. Carrick, 3-4 Nev. Rep. (Hawley's Republication) 138
(1867). See esp. p. 141 of the opinion.
CASE QoMMENTS
Held, the restrictions not binding as having been abandoned and their
purpose defeated by changing conditions. Goodwin Bros. v. Uombs
Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S. W. (2d) 1024 (1938).
Following Tulk v. Moxhay,1 restrictive covenants on the use of land,
imposed for the benefit of adjoining land, have been generally enforced.
Such covenants, whether called equitable easements,2 or covenants
running with the land,3 are held to be enforceable, against successors
to the covenantor, only in equity,4 and then only when the successors
are not bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the restric-
tion.' As a general proposition, even though a restrictive covenant be
regarded as a real property interest,' if for any reason equity refuses
to enforce it, that interest ceases to exist.7
When there has been such a change in the character of the neigh-
borhood as to defeat the purpose of the restriction, it will not be
enforced.8 Refusal to specifically enforce a restrictive covenant, how-
ever, does not always mean that it will be ignored, and some courts
have held that damages may be recovered for breach of a restriction
which, by reason of a change in the neighborhood, equity will not
specifically enforce. The remedy may take the form of retaining the
injunction suit for assessment of damages, after denial of the injunc-
tion,1 9 or awarding damages on condition of releasing the servitude,"
or the court may suggest that damages, if any, are to be recovered in
law.12
The proposition that damages of any kind may be awarded in these
12 Phillips 774 (Eng. 1848).
2Pomeroy, 4 Eq. Juris. (4th ed. 1919) 3958n-3959n.
3 Highland Realty Co. v. Groves, 130 Ky. 374, 113 S. W. 420 (1908);
Leader v. ta Flamme, 111 Me. 242, 88 A. 859 (1913); Zller v. Gold-
berg, 183 Mich. 197, 149 N. W. 989 (1914); Withers v. Ward, 86 W. Va.
558, 104 S. E. 96 (1920).
' Pomeroy, op. cit. supra, note 1.
SClark, Principles of Equity (1919) 120.
6 "According to the preferable analysis, an equitable servitude gives
rights of property rather than of contract" 38 Harv. L. R. 115 (1924)
citing 31 Harv. L. R. 876. See also Riverbank Improvement Co. v.
Chadwick, 228 Mass. 243, 117 N. D. 244 (1917).
' This must necessarily follow from the fact that equitable servi,
tudes are enforceable only in equity.
'Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P. (2d) 496 (1932); Clark
v. Vaughn, 131 Kans. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (1930); Ocean City Land Co.
v. Weber, 83 N. J. Eq. 476, 91 A -600 (1914); Columbia College v.
Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311 (1882); Knight v. Simmonds, 2 Ch. 294 (Eng.
1896).
Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311 (1882); Bull v. Burton,
227 N. Y. 101, 124 N. E. 111 (1919).
'
0Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N. E. 691 (1892).
n Amerman v. Deane, 132 N. Y. 355, 30 N. E. 741 (1892).
Whether the equity court assess damages after denial of the injunc-
tion or award damages on condition of releasing the servitude, it is
In effect condemning private property for private use, i. e., compelling
the dominant owner to sell his interest to the servient owner. See 31
Harv. L. R. 876 (1918) at 878.
12McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36, 75 N. E. 961 (1905).
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cases is criticised by Dean Pound." He says: "It is submitted that the
sound course is to hold that when the purpose of the restriction can
no longer be carried out the servitude comes to and end; that the
duration of the servitude is determined by its purpose.... When the
original purpose can no longer be carried out, the same reasons that
established its existence are valid to establish its termination. There
is then nothing left to protect by injunction and nothing for which
to award damages."
4
Meager case authority in Kentucky must submit to this criticism.
In Doll v. Moise, the court awarded damages after enforcement of the
restriction had been refused, apparently treating the covenant as run-
ning with the land at law.16 The decision is open to the objection that
the burden of a restrictive covenant does not run with the land at law
in a fee simple conveyance where the only interest retained in the land
conveyed is that created by the covenant itself.7
In the instant case, a declaratory judgment is rendered declaring
a restrictive covenant terminated by change in neighborhood, and the
court is not concerned with an award of damages. Since the restric-
tions were not binding, there could be no breach, and, without a breach,
no occasion for an award of damages. To put it tersely, if the purpose
of the restriction is attainable, it will be enforced by injunction; if
""Progress of the Law-Equity", 33 Harv. L. R. 813 (1919).
14 Id. at 821.
35214 Ky. 123, 282 S. W. 763 (1926).
"An injunction against building in violation of a restriction had
been denied because the construction was so far advanced that the
court was of the opinion that its removal would damage the defendant
out of proportion to the damage sustained by the plaintiff by its erec-
tion. In this action at law, the plaintiff recovered damages for breach
of the restriction. Though the lot had been resold several times, the
court quoted from Highland Realty Co. v. Groves, 130 Ky. 374, 113
S. W. 420 (1908) that "The covenants run with the land, and are
mutual, inuring to the benefit of all appellant's vendees." In the High-
land case, however, the suit was by the covenantee against the original
covenantor for an injunction, and the court, as is evident in the
excerpt quoted, had reference to the benefit, not to the burden.
"7This proposition appears to be generally accepted as the law.
Maitland says: "We shall assume in every case that the person against
whom the covenant is to be enforced is a purchaser of the land of the
covenantor bound by the covenant who bought with notice of the cove-
nant. Against such a person the covenant will not be enforceable at
law .... Equity, (2nd ed. 1936) 169-70. In I Smith's Leading Cases,
(8th Am. ed. 1884) 185, it is stated that "It results from what has been
said that the burden of a covenant made with the owner of land with
an entire stranger in estate, will not pass with the land at law to an
assignee .. " Walsh explains that "The reason why a covenant plac-
ing a burden on the land does not run with it in like cases where no
tenure, easement, or other privity exists, is that such burdens tend to
make the land inalienable and are therefore contrary to public policy."
Hist. Eng. and Am. Law (1923) 307. See also Brewer v. Marshall,
19 N. J. Eq. 337 (1867), at 343; Austerberry v. Corp. of Oldham, 29 Ch.
750 (1885), at 773; Salmond, The Law of Torts, (5th ed. 1919) 281.
CASE: COMMENTS
not, it will be declared non-existent.19 A declaratory judgment was
refused in Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick," as taking "private
property for private use" contrary to the Bill of Rights,m and in
Strong v. Shatto, on the ground that a change in neighborhood did
not relieve from the contractual obligation imposed by the restriction.
When, however, the restriction is no longer of practical benefit, the
better view seems to be that equity will remove it as a cloud on the
plaintiff's title. -? As it clearly appeared in the instant case that the
purpose for which the restriction was imposed had been defeated, the
court reaches the proper result. I MLRVIN Twcn
CONFLICT OF LAWS-TORTS-SUIT IN A FOREIGN COURT ON
AN OBLIGATION CREATED BY THE LAW OF THE
PLACE OF TORT
Defendant and his wife were citizens of New York. 'While the
wife was vacationing in Florida without her husband she assaulted the
plaintiff. Suit was brought by the plaintiff in New York where she
seeks to enforce liability against the defendant husband on the ground
that in Florida, where the tort occurred, a husband is liable for his
wife's torts.' Defendant moved that the complaint be dismissed because
under the New York law a husband is not liable for the separate torts
of his wife.2 Held: Complaint dismissed. The law of New York was
applied and the husband was not liable for the tort of his wife. Sieg-
rnan v. Meyer, 100 F. (2d) 367 (1938).
In deciding the case Judge Hand announced his theory of the
conflict of laws to be: "Strictly speaking, it is impossible for a court to
enforce a liability except one created by the law of the state in which
it sits. That state may take for its model a liability created by another
1 Equity really can have little discretion in the type of remedy.
See note 11, supra. If there is a binding restriction, it constitutes a
property right which a court has no authority to take for private use.
If there is no binding restriction, there is nothing. The only discretion
left to the court lies in determining whether there exists a valid
restriction.
"228 Mass. 243, 117 N. E. 244 (1917).
The Massachusetts statute allowing the removal of a covenant by
the court where there had been a change in the neighborhood, and pro-
viding that the defendant be paid for any loss caused by the removal
was held invalid.
"145 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1920).
21icArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N. E. 162 (1915);
Burton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935).
This view is in accord with that expressed by Pound that when the pur-
pose of the restriction has failed of accomplishment there is "nothing
left to protect by injunction." Supra, note 13 at 821.
1Meek v. Johnson, 85 Fla. 248, 95 So. 670 (1923); Greene v. Miller,
102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532 (1931).
2 N. Y. Domestic Relations Law sec. 57, Strubing v. Mahar, 46 App.
Div. 409, 61 N. Y. Supp. 799 (1899); Tanzer v. Read, 160 App. Div.
584, 145 N. Y. Supp. 708 (1914).
